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Law Is What the Judge Had for Breakfast:
A Brief History of an Unpalatable Idea
Dan Priel†
ABSTRACT
According to a familiar adage the legal realists equated law with
what the judge had for breakfast. As this is sometimes used to
ridicule the realists, prominent defenders of legal realism have
countered that none of the realists ever entertained any such idea.
In this Essay I show that this is inaccurate. References to this idea
are found in the work of Karl Llewellyn and Jerome Frank, as well
as in the works of their contemporaries, both friends and foes.
However, the Essay also shows that the idea is improperly
attributed to the legal realists, as there are many references to it,
in legal and non-legal sources, from long before the advent of legal
realism. This suggests that the phrase has long reflected something
of a received wisdom about adjudication. Tracing the question of the
significance of digestion to one’s health, I argue that what we today
take to be a humorous claim, may have been a much more serious
one. For much of the nineteenth century it was widely believed that
one’s health depended on one’s digestive health. Interestingly, this
view is now once again taken seriously by scientists, which suggests
that rather than scorn, the realists deserve credit for suggesting
that the question be studied seriously.

† Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. Thanks to Charles
Barzun, Molly Brady, Chad Flanders, Philip Girard, Richard Haigh, Jennah
Khaled, Matt Steilen, Jack Schlegel, Max Weaver, and especially Simon Stern for
their comments as well as for alerting me to some sources I overlooked.
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Now I really do see that judges and governors ought to be and
need to be made of bronze, so as not to be worn out by all the
pestering from these folks who come on business and expect you to
be listening to them and dealing with them at all hours of the day
and night, and attending only to their affairs, come what may . . . .
So, all you fools and idiots coming on business: don’t be in such a
hurry, wait until the proper time, don’t come when it’s time for me
to be eating or sleeping, because judges are made of flesh and blood,
and must give to nature what nature naturally needs . . . . 1

I. DID THE REALISTS EVER SAY THIS?
The nineteenth-century English judge Charles Bowen
once said, “the state of a man’s mind is as much a fact as the
state of his digestion.”2 This may be so, but the connection
between mind and digestion has proven contentious. For
decades it has been said that the legal realists believed that
law is determined by what the judge had for breakfast, an
idea that, naturally enough, has not endeared itself to some
judges. When Judge Alex Kozinski wanted to make fun of the
legal realists, and perhaps legal academics more generally,
this was his prime example.3 For him, this idea showed just
how ridiculous some legal scholars’ ideas could be, how
unmoored from reality, and perhaps even how irresponsible.4
1. MIGUEL DE CERVANTES, DON QUIXOTE 812 (John Rutherford trans.,
Penguin Classics 2000) (1615).
2. Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch D 459, 483 (C.A. 1885) (Eng.) (Bowen
L.J.).
3. See Alex Kozinski, What I Ate for Breakfast and Other Mysteries of
Judicial Decision Making, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 993, 993 (1993).
4. See id. at 998 (the realists told judges “they can follow their leanings with
abandon and everything will be all right . . . . If the public should become
convinced—as many academicians apparently are—that judges are reaching
results not based on principle but to serve a political agenda, . . . that will affect
our way of life for years to come, perhaps permanently.”). In an interview he gave
shortly after his retirement from the Supreme Court, Potter Stewart described
Yale Law School of his student days in the late 1930s as dominated by “judicial
realism.” It paid no attention to legal rules, but explained decisions on the basis
of a judge’s biographical background, and, of course, “what the judge had for
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In a rare show of bipartisan alliance, liberal stalwart Ronald
Dworkin was in agreement with conservative Kozinski, for
he too objected to the “disastrous,” “catch-phrase . . . that
some of the realists themselves encouraged,” that “law is . . .
only a matter of what the judges eat for breakfast.”5
Neither Kozinski nor Dworkin mentioned by name any
legal realist who actually used this expression. By the time
they were writing, the attribution of this phrase to the legal
realists (or its close equivalent, that the law depends on the
state of a judge’s digestion), became so much part of legal lore
that even fastidious law-review editors let it stand without a
citation. But did any legal realist ever say it? In his
sympathetic reconstruction of legal realism Brian Leiter
denied the charge.6 Frederick Schauer has also failed to
identify any clear source for the idea, suggesting instead that
Jerome Frank only made this as an “offhand oral quip,” or
that he was wrongly saddled with what others had said, and
only “in jest.”7 Charles Yablon reported that he tried to trace
the attribution of the phrase to the legal realists but
admitted failure.8 And yet, despite the supposed lack of
supporting evidence, the attribution of this expression to the
legal realists lives on, appearing regularly in both academic
breakfast.” See Samuel G. Freedman, Ex-Justice Stewart Relives the Eli Life, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 30, 1982, at B1.
5. Ronald Dworkin, Dissent on Douglas, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 19, 1981, at
4 (emphasis added).
6. See BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN
LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 62 (2007) (arguing that
even the few realists who believed that the judge’s personality determined the
decision did not think that the judge’s breakfast determine the outcome of cases).
7. FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL REASONING 129 n.15 (2009); see also Giovanni Tuzet, A Short Note on
Digestive Realism, 25 REVUS 11, 11 (2015) (stating it is “unclear whether any of
the American realists really claimed anything of that sort”). In his essay Tuzet
discussed two early invocations of the relationship between adjudication and
digestion in the work of eighteenth-century thinkers Julien Offray de la Mettrie
and Cesare Beccaria. In fact, two legal realists cited these authors in relation to
this idea. See notes 37 and 62, infra.
8. Charles M. Yablon, Justifying the Judge’s Hunch: An Essay on Discretion,
41 HASTINGS L.J. 231, 236 n.16 (1990).
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literature and newspapers, invariably without any
reference.9 At times it is described as a “caricature” of legal
realism,10 possibly just a vivid exaggeration of what the legal
realists had actually said; at other times, the phrase is said
to reflect the actual views of the realists.11 Is there any truth
to the claim that the legal realists believed that law has
anything to do with what the judge had for breakfast, or is
this just an urban legend?
As the examples of Kozinski and Dworkin illustrate, it is
the critics of realism who may be most responsible for
keeping alive both the phrase and its connection to legal
realism. Of those, there is one in particular that deserves a
special mention. Walter Kennedy, described as “perhaps the
most widely respected Catholic legal scholar”12 in America of

9. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE
RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW 18 (1997); John F. Duffy, Why
Business Methods Patents?, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1247, 1284 (2011); Gary Peller, The
Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1220 (1985); Austin Sarat
& Jonathan Simon, Beyond Legal Realism?: Cultural Analysis, Cultural Studies,
and the Situation of Legal Scholarship, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 3, 14 (2001). This
is but a small sampling. For a recent reference, showing the idea lives on beyond
the legal academy, and that its association with legal realism has crossed the
Atlantic, see David Pannick, Why No Offender Wants to Face a Judge Who Is
Tired, Hungry or Disappointed, TIMES (London) (Jan. 19, 2017), http://www.the
times.co.uk/article/why-no-offender-wants-to-face-a-judge-who-is-tired-hungryor-disappointed-6bdxbm2w0.
10. See, e.g., John N. Drobak & Douglass C. North, Understanding Judicial
Decision-Making: The Importance of Constraints on Non-Rational Deliberations,
26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 131, 136 (2008).
11. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 36, 153 (1986) (“Some of [the realists]
took great satisfaction in provocative statements of their position” such as that
“law is only what the judge had for breakfast”); see also supra notes 3–5 and
accompanying text. For an even more extreme example of false attribution see
PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: HOW LAW IS SUFFOCATING
AMERICA 24 (1994) (“The most famous description of the new realism was by
Professor Robert Hutchins: ‘What the judge has for breakfast is more important
than any principle of law.’”). Howard provided no citation for this quotation,
which I could not locate. It seems extremely unlikely, as in Hutchins’s only
reference to the expression that I found, he called it an “absurdity” and a “horrid
possibilit[y].” Robert Maynard Hutchins, The Autobiography of an Ex-Law
Student, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 514 (1934).
12. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC
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his generation, was part of a group of Catholic law professors
who repeatedly attacked the legal realists during the 1930s
and 1940s.13 Kennedy was by far the most committed to the
cause, penning over fifteen articles dedicated to realism
bashing.14
For Kennedy, just as it would be for Kozinski half a
century later, the what-the-judge-had-for-breakfast trope
served as a reductio ad absurdum, a distillation of everything
wrong with legal realism. Kennedy never tired of making
mocking references to this idea, telling his readers the
realists believed lawyers should become “stomach
specialists,”15
that
they
thought
“gastronomical
16
disturbances,” affected the outcomes of cases, that they
claimed lawyers should not bother with “dust-laden
volumes,” but investigate instead “how [the judge or
legislator’s] digestive tract is functioning.”17 In one place, he
called the idea that judgments were influenced by the judges’
digestion as the “so-called ‘wheatie-explanation’ of judicial
decisions.”18
NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 165 (1973).
13. For the most comprehensive discussion of the Catholic critique of legal
realism see John M. Breen & Lee J. Strang, The Forgotten Jurisprudential
Debate: Catholic Legal Thought’s Response to Legal Realism, 98 MARQ. L. REV.
1203 (2015). Breen and Strang list fourteen Catholic scholars who wrote critically
about legal realism. See id. at 1258 n.416.
14. See id. at 1230 n.200 for a list of seventeen essays by him containing a
substantial critique of legal realism. Even this list is incomplete as it does not
include critical book reviews, see, e.g., infra note 18.
15. Walter B. Kennedy, Another Job for Jurisprudence, 8 MOD. L. REV. 18, 21
(1945).
16. Walter B. Kennedy, Law Reviews “as Usual”?: A War Program, 12
FORDHAM L. REV. 50, 55 (1943); accord Walter B. Kennedy, A Review of Legal
Realism, 9 FORDHAM L. REV. 362, 366 (1940) (attributing to the legal realists “the
gastronomical approach which urges the advocate to take a sly glance at the
judge’s breakfast menu.”).
17. Walter B. Kennedy, Men or Laws, 2 BROOK. L. REV. 11, 13 (1932).
18. Walter B. Kennedy, Book Review, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 995, 996 n.6 (1941)
(reviewing EDWIN N. GARLAN, LEGAL REALISM AND JUSTICE (1941)); see also
Hutchins, supra note 11, at 514 (referring to the “slogan for Shredded Wheat,
‘Tell me what you eat and I’ll tell you what you are.’”).
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It would be tempting to dismiss the charge as a case of
false attribution, if it were not for the fact that it was not just
critics that drew a connection between realism and judicial
digestion. During the 1930s Charles Clark was a professor
and later dean at Yale Law School, where many of the
realists were based, and he is usually considered one of their
ranks.19 In a lecture he gave in 1941, by then a federal
appeals judge, Clark made it clear to his audience that he
thought the legal realists had an important message, and
that their ideas should not be ignored.20 But Clark distanced
himself from those “who are said to belong to the
‘gastronomical school’ of jurisprudence, to which the most
important thing in a law case is the temporary state of the
judge’s digestion.”21 Yet he too named no members of this
supposed school; and so the puzzle remains. Is this just
negative advertising that caught on?

19. Clark appeared in Llewellyn’s list of legal realists found in Karl N.
Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV.
L. REV. 1222, 1226 n.17 (1931); see also LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE,
1927–1960, at 105 (1986) (Clark was a “committed legal realist[].”).
20. Charles E. Clark, The Function of Law in a Democratic Society, 9 U. CHI.
L. REV. 393, 395 (1941).
21. Charles E. Clark, Book Review, 23 YALE REV. 424, 426 (1934) (reviewing
MORRIS R. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
(1933)); accord Clark, supra note 20, at 394 (“the legal realists have acquired the
name—or frame—of the ‘gastronomical school of jurisprudence,’ since they are
supposed to attribute judicial opinion primarily to what the judge had for
breakfast.”).
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II. YES, THEY DID
These early attributions to legal realists of a link
between adjudication and digestion, by both allies and
critics, show that the association between judicial digestion
and legal realism started early. This only makes the question
of the origins of this idea even more intriguing: Where did it
come from? As far as I could find, the first appearance of
something resembling this idea in the published work of an
American legal academic appeared in a 1905 essay by Roscoe
Pound. He wrote there that judges should not be like, “the
oriental cadi administering justice at the city gate by the
light of nature tempered by the state of his digestion for the
time being.”22
Whether Pound belongs in the ranks of the legal realists
is a topic best left for another place.23 He is not usually
considered one, though, because he is the author of the first
sustained attack on legal realism.24 Be that as it may, Pound
used the idea that judges may decide cases based on the state
of their digestion, perhaps facetiously, as a contrast to his
ideal of principled adjudication, not as a description of
reality. His view was thus quite the opposite of the alleged
realist view. And in any event, neither Kennedy nor Clark
mentioned Pound in their essays. Clark, in fact, did not cite
anyone who held this view. But Kennedy did: His source was
an article by Karl Llewellyn, entitled On Reading and Using

22. Roscoe Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 20, 21 (1905).
This passage is quoted in Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human? Part One: The
Effects on Legal Thinking of the Assumption that Judges Behave Like Human
Beings, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 24 n.17 (1931) [hereinafter Frank, Are Judges
Human?]. Frank, however, criticized Pound’s legal orientalism. See id. at 24–25;
see also Jerome Frank, Book Review, 56 YALE L.J. 589, 591 n.5 (1947).
23. On the realists’ complicated relationship with Pound (and vice versa) see
N.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND AND KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE 2, passim (1997).
24. See Roscoe Pound, The Call for Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV.
697 (1931).
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the Newer Jurisprudence.25 The essay was a critical survey
of ideas that had been percolating in the legal academy in
the previous decade. Its main goal was to show that the
questions and problems that “jurisprudes” were discussing
at the time were relevant and useful even for the most
practically-oriented lawyers. Llewellyn, at the time a
professor at Columbia, clearly thought the message
important enough for legal practitioners that, in addition to
publishing it in his home law review, he arranged to have it
published in the American Bar Association’s journal as well.
Llewellyn’s essay covers a lot of ground with about two
pages of it dedicated to, “the Jurisprudence of advocacy.”26 It
was important for lawyers to consider judges’ personalities,
he wrote there, as those may affect the outcome of cases.
Such a study should “not ignore the facts of life,” which
include the possibility that, “[i]n the case of a particular
judge subject to dyspepsia, the unfortunate effects of a
particular ill-advised breakfast do alter the advocate’s
practical problem.”27 Such happenstances, as well as
ailments of a more permanent nature, he said, are plainly
relevant for litigators’ work, and are probably familiar to all
of them. He therefore “confess[ed] to total inability to
understand why” discussing such matters should be
considered “unilluminating or indecent.”28 Nevertheless,
Llewellyn qualified these remarks by saying that he never
studied any “judge’s breakfast, or headache,” and he did not
think either “a peculiarly fruitful line of study.”29

25. The article was published in two parts in 26 A.B.A. J. 300, 418 (1940) and
in one part in 40 COLUM. L. REV. 581 (1940). Further citations are to the Columbia
Law Review version. See Karl Llewellyn, On Reading and Using the Newer
Jurisprudence, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 581 (1940).
26. Id. at 594.
27. Id. at 592.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 593.
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Though Llewellyn made no reference to any previous
scholarship, the apologetic tone of his remarks on the subject
suggests that he was responding to already-existing
associations between legal realism and judicial breakfasts.
And Kennedy had in fact tied the realists to judicial digestion
already in 1932, almost a decade before the publication of
Llewellyn’s essay.30 Similarly, Clark’s first reference to
gastronomic jurisprudence, in 1934, suggests that by then
the link between realism and indigestion was familiar.31
And indeed there is an earlier, and much clearer,
discussion of the relationship between adjudication and
digestion in a well-known realist tract. Jerome Frank’s Law
and the Modern Mind was published in 1930 and
immediately caused a stir.32 Here was a book written by a
practitioner who did away with many of the self-

30. See Kennedy, supra note 17.
31. Clark, supra note 21. By the mid-1930s, the term “gastronomic
jurisprudence” was familiar enough that it was mentioned without explanation
or citation. See Frederick K. Beutel, Some Implications of Experimental
Jurisprudence, 48 HARV. L. REV. 169, 190 (1934); George W. Goble, Law as a
Science, 9 IND. L.J. 294, 302 (1934); Orvill C. Snyder, The Corporate Person and
the Fourteenth Amendment, 8 BROOK. L. REV. 4, 20 (1938); see also Proceedings of
the Thirty-Seventh Annual Meeting Held at Chicago, December 28, 29, and 30,
1939, 9 AM. L. SCH. REV. 647, 662 (1940) (comments by Professor William L.
Prosser); Harold Gill Reuschlein, Some Books about the Constitution, Its Makers
and Its Interpreters, 27 GEO. L.J. 1149, 1165 (1939) (book review); Franklin F.
Russell, Book Review, 9 BROOK. L. REV. 104, 111 (1939) (reviewing JEROME HALL,
READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE (1938)).
32. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). Several
newspapers reported the book was a bestseller. See Best Seller, PITTSBURGH
PRESS, Feb 1, 1931, § 6, at 5; S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 29, 1931, § 3, at 12 (“Crashing
the best seller lists”); DAILY PLAINSMAN (Huron, S.D.), Jan. 31, 1931, at 7; Literary
Notes, ST. JOSEPH GAZETTE, Feb. 15, 1931, at A14. In addition to numerous
reviews in legal journals, the book was widely reviewed in newspapers and
magazines. See, e.g., Thurman W. Arnold, Law and Men, SATURDAY REV.
LITERATURE, March 7, 1931, at 644; Morris R. Cohen, Change and Fixity in the
Law, NATION, Sep. 9, 1931, at 259; Walton H. Hamilton, The Legalism of Law,
NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 21, 1931, at 277; Robert von Moschzisker, “Law and the
Modern Mind”: A Lively Controversial Volume, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 31, 1931,
at 10; Max Radin, Giving Away the Legal Show, N.Y. HERALD TRIB. BOOKS, Dec.
21, 1930, at 5; Chester Rohrlich, The Legal Mind Psychoanalyzed, N.Y. TIMES
BOOK REV., Dec. 7, 1930, at 22.
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congratulatory pieties of his profession and presented to the
world a thoroughly unvarnished account of the law. To this
day the book enjoys a rather notorious reputation,33 not
entirely deserved. Though not without its faults (which
Frank later acknowledged),34 the book is reformist and
humanist in spirit, and not at all cynical or nihilist.35
One of the many topics the book addresses is the view
that legal outcomes are primarily governed by legal rules.
Frank did not deny the existence and significance of legal
rules to adjudication, but he insisted that they were only part
of the story. Another important element, Frank argued, and
one that lawyers tended to underplay, was the personality of
the judge. One piece of evidence Frank relied on was an
obscure 1869 decision by the Alabama Supreme Court. He
quoted approvingly (and italicized for extra effect) the court’s
proclamation that:
[I]t can not safely be denied that mere judicial discretion is
sometimes very much interfered with by prejudge, which may be
swayed and controlled by the merest trifles such as the toothache,
the rheumatism, the gout, or a fit of indigestion, or even through
the very means by which indigestion is frequently sought to be
avoided.36

This, then, is the smoking gun. Legal realism’s single
most famous book suggested a clear link between the state
of judge’s mind and the state of his digestion. And it is not

33. Dworkin called it “a bible of the crudest form of [legal] realism.” Dworkin,
supra note 5.
34. See Jerome Frank, Legal Thinking in Three Dimensions, 1 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 9, 9–10 (1949).
35. See Charles L. Barzun, Jerome Frank and the Modern Mind, 58 BUFF. L.
REV. 1127 (2010); cf. Helmut Coing, Tendencies in Modern American Legal
Philosophy: A Survey, 40 GEO. L.J. 523, 537 (1952) (“It was by no means Frank’s
intention to say that prejudices, indigestion, etc., were the bases of law; he made
use of them only to point out what uncertain factors play a part in the true life of
the law.”).
36. Ex Parte Chase, 43 Ala. 303, 310–11 (1869), quoted in FRANK, supra note
32, at 137. Frank did not forget this case and quoted from it again in JEROME
FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 414 (1949).
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the only one. In an article published the following year, in
part in response to the reactions to Law and the Modern
Mind, Frank mentioned that the eighteenth-century French
author Julien Offray de La Mettrie wrote of a person “who
‘was when fasting, the most upright and merciful judge, but
woe to the wretch who came before him when he had made
a hearty dinner; he was then disposed to hang everybody,
the innocent as well as the guilty.’”37
It is not entirely clear why Kennedy chose to cite
Llewellyn and not Frank, even though Frank’s endorsement
of the idea was far more forthright. Kennedy knew Law and
the Modern Mind and though not an admirer,38 he
acknowledged its “lively and attractive style.”39 Maybe it is
the fact Frank quoted a case in support of his contention that
made him a less congenial target. Coming from what even
then was an old judicial decision from a state Supreme Court
gave the idea the kind of respectability, even authority, that
the ramblings of an out-of-touch Ivy League academic could
never have.40

37. Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human? Part Two: As Through a Class Darkly,
80 U. PA. L. REV. 233, 247 (1931) (quoting JOSEPH NEEDHAM, THE SCEPTICAL
BIOLOGIST 176 (1930) (quoting MAN A MACHINE 12–13 (London, W. Owen 1749)));
see also FRANK, supra note 32, at 162.
38. See Walter B. Kennedy, A Required Course in Jurisprudence, 9 AM. L.
SCH. REV. 593, 594–95 (1940).
39. Walter B. Kennedy, The Cult of the Robe: A Dissent, 14 FORDHAM L. REV.
192, 192 (1945).
40. A more mundane reason is that by the early 1940s Frank and Kennedy
were engaged in an amicable exchange of letters (which make reference to
lunches together as well, as both were then based in New York). In one of the
letters Kennedy wrote to Frank, “I have enjoyed immensely reading your letters.”
Letter from Walter B. Kennedy to Jerome Frank (Nov. 5, 1941) at 3. They
considered writing an article together for the sake of “eliminating needless wordquarrels.” Letter from Jerome Frank to Walter B. Kennedy (Nov. 6, 1941).
Kennedy even drafted an outline for this article, but the article never
materialized. See Walter B. Kennedy, “Realism And/Or Scholasticism?” (Nov. 12,
1941) (unpublished manuscript). (All materials cited in this note are available at
Yale University Library, Manuscripts and Archives, Jerome New Frank Papers,
Box 58, Folder 480.).
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The decision and its author are interesting enough to be
worthy of a closer look. The case involved a petition by one
John W. Chase, a white man accused of murdering a black
man, to have his trial removed from Montgomery County.
Chase alleged that due to a concerted effort to vilify him,
public opinion in Montgomery and neighboring counties,
where black population was substantial, was set against him
and for this reason he would not get a fair trial. The specific
question the court had to address was the scope of discretion
available to the trial court in deciding whether to remove the
case: The statute in question said that a defendant “may
have his trial removed to another county,” and the
prosecution argued that this meant the trial court enjoyed
wide discretion, which should not be interfered with, on
whether to allow or refuse the motion. The Alabama
Supreme Court, however, sided with the defendant.
The author of the decision was Justice Thomas Minott
Peters (1810–1888), who would later serve briefly as Chief
Justice of Alabama. He was a man of considerable abilities
and achievements, who “distinguished himself as a lawyer, a
judge, a state assemblyman, a teacher, a schoolmaster, a
newspaper editor, and as a scientist with a national
reputation who was elected to the American Scientific
Association.”41 A committed Unionist, Peters argued after
the Civil War for the application of the Civil Rights Act of
1866 as a challenge to Black Codes, and even successfully
defended an interracial marriage from a legal challenge.42
After he was elected to the Alabama Supreme Court, Justice
Peters issued a series of decisions that affirmed his
opposition to the secession and his commitment to the civil
rights of newly enfranchised former slaves.43

41. Paul Horton, Lightning Rod Scalawag: The Unlikely Political Career of
Thomas Minott Peters, 64 ALA. REV. 116, 119 (2011).
42. Id. at 129.
43. See id. at 133–35. All this apparently made Peters “one of the most hated
jurists in Alabama history.” Id. at 116.
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Justice Peters’s Chase decision consisted of two steps. He
first explained that the right to a trial heard by a “fair and
impartial jury” was a fundamental right that could never be
infringed. The strength of this right, he argued, affected the
scope of the discretion. Consequently, Peters argued that the
word “may” in the relevant statute should be read as “must,”
assuming the facts regarding the impediments to a fair trial
are shown to be true. As something of a rhetorical flourish
Justice Peters then considered the dangers of wide
discretion. The full passage from which some words have
already been quoted reads as follows:
The writer of this opinion has known a popular judicial officer grow
quite angry with a suitor in his court, and threaten him with
imprisonment, for no ostensible reason, save the fact, that he wore
an overcoat made of wolf skins! Moreover, it cannot safely be denied,
that mere judicial discretion is sometimes very much interfered
with by prejudice, which may be swayed and controlled by the
merest trifles—such as the tooth ache, the rheumatism, the gout, or
a fit of indigestion, or even through the very means by which
indigestion is frequently sought to be avoided.44

Peters then added:
Whatever may have been the construction of this important
statute heretofore, it is now evidently unwise longer to keep so
indispensible [sic] a right as that of “a fair and impartial trial,[”] in
a criminal case, under the uncertain security of a power, so
uncontrollable and liable to error as mere judicial discretion—a
power that may possibly be misdirected by a fit of temporary
sickness, an extra mint julep, or the smell or looks of a peculiar
overcoat, or things more trivial than these, which may imperil the
due course of justice in the administration of the law. Trifles,
however ridiculous, cease to be trifles when they potentially
interfere with the safe administration of the law. 45

44. Ex Parte Chase, 43 Ala. 303, 310–11 (1869).
45. Id. at 311.
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Discretion, then, was dangerous, because it is likely to lead
judges to rely on their unconscious prejudices and biases.
This is by now a familiar idea.46
For Frank, this was just an illustration of the fact that
judges were affected by the same unconscious influences that
affected everyone else; or, more simply, that judges were
human.47 Nevertheless, Frank did not follow Justice Peters’s
reasoning all the way through. Frank thought the
discretionary element in adjudication was ineliminable and
therefore it was better openly disclosed and discussed than
concealed and ignored. And like many other legal realists, he
thought that some uncertainty in the law was positive as it
gave the law its vitality and ability to adapt to changing
circumstances.48 But it is clear why he focused on this issue
more than other legal realists: Frank had a life-long
obsession with trials. In his mind, other legal scholars
(including most legal realists) suffered from a malady he
called “appellate-court-itis,” the excessive focus on appellate
courts.49 He thought trials were far more important than
appellate decisions and deserved much greater attention
than they received, not least because their outcomes were far
less predictable.
46. In this sense, the expression “what the judge had for breakfast” (without
reference to the legal realists) has appeared in more recent court decisions,
including one Supreme Court dissent. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296,
332 (2004) (Breyer J., dissenting) (arguing that with indeterminate sentences
“[t]he length of time a person spent in prison appeared to depend on what ‘what
the judge had for breakfast’ on the day of sentencing.”); see also Corder v. Corder,
34 Cal. Rptr.3d 294, 323 (Ct. App. 2005), rev’d, 161 P.3d 172 (Cal. 2007).
47. See Frank, Are Judges Human?, supra note 22; Frank, supra note 37.
48. See FRANK, supra note 32, at 98. For other realists expressing this view
see, for example, William O. Douglas, The Dissent: A Safeguard of Democracy, 32
J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 104, 105 (1948); Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Glorious
Uncertainty of Our Lady of the Law, 23 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 73 (1939); Karl
N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules of or
Canons about How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 397 (1950).
49. Frank, supra note 34, at 23. Frank’s target here is only Benjamin Cardozo.
Elsewhere Frank led a more general charge against what he called “the upper
court myth, the myth that upper courts are the heart of court-house government.”
FRANK, supra note 36, at 222–24.
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Contrary to his image as someone who dismissed legal
rules and legal reasoning, Frank insisted that they mattered
a great deal.50 He went so far as to say that the much-derided
Langdellian method was a “signal success” with respect to
teaching and preparing for appellate litigation.51 By
contrast, trials largely turned on the determination of facts,
and facts, as Frank memorably put it, “are guesses.”52 This
interest in the trial may explain his willingness to discuss
the gastronomical idea more openly than others. Appellate
decisions are less often decided on the spot and are typically
decided by a multi-member panel. These factors reduce the
odds that the fleeting discomforts that afflict us all on
occasion will affect the outcome of a given case.53 Their
potential for influence is more significant, however, in the
many quick, reasons-free decisions that are part of every
trial.54
Though Frank is sometimes said to have softened in his
later years, especially after his appointment to the federal
Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit,55 his 1949 book
Courts on Trial retains the vigor of his earlier offerings. In
it, Frank returned to the topic of the hidden influences on
judicial decision making and once again did not shy from

50. See FRANK, supra note 36, at 196.
51. Jerome Frank, Both Ends Against the Middle, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 20, 22
(1951).
52. See FRANK, supra note 34, at 14.
53. Cf. Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases,
93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 35–37 (2007) (more time and written judgments can
undercut intuitive judgment); Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the
Nature of the Judicial Function, 96 GEO. L.J. 1283, 1314, 1324–27 (2008) (writing
increases deliberation and undermines intuitive judgment).
54. At times Frank recognized that the “personal element” affects appellate
judges as well. See Frank, Are Judges Human?, supra note 22, at 29. But it seems
he acknowledged that this element is more significant in explaining the outcomes
of trials. See id. at 29–30.
55. See Edgar Bodenheimer, Cardozo’s Views on Law and Adjudication
Revisited, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1095, 1117 (1989); R.H. Graveson, Book Review,
32 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT’L L. 110, 110 (1950).
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making a reference to judges’ stomachs. As he put it, though
“no one, except jocularly, has ever proposed explaining all or
most decisions in terms of the judges’ digestive
disturbances,”56 such effects could not be ignored. “Out of my
experience as a trial lawyer,” he wrote, “I can testify that a
trial judge, because of overeating at lunch, may be so
somnolent in the afternoon court-session that he fails to hear
an important item of testimony and so disregards it when
deciding the case.”57
There is a further twist to the story, for the attitude
toward the judge’s indigestion reveals something about an
important divide among the legal realists. Elsewhere, I have
argued that what we now call “legal realism” consisted of two
very distinct groups of scholars, who on a series of issues held
very different views. One realist group was realistic in the
sense that it wanted to make the academic study of law more
oriented toward legal practice. It saw the real danger in what
it perceived as an excessively theoretical approach to the
study of law, one that did not adequately reflect law as it was
found in the real world. The other realist strand wanted to
push the academic study of law in the opposite direction,
away from legal practice and in the direction of greater ties
with the rest of the university, and especially with the
natural sciences. Those who belong to this group were realist
in the sense that they considered the study of law continuous
with scientific realism.58 Llewellyn and Frank were the most
notable members of the first group, and as such were willing
to say that these psychological factors were part of the law,
or (if it’s any different) part of legal practice.59 On the other

56. FRANK, supra note 32, at 162.
57. Id.
58. See Dan Priel, The Return of Legal Realism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
LEGAL HISTORY 457, 464–69 (Markus D. Dubber & Christopher Tomlins eds.,
2018); see also ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 68, 195–96 (1993).
59. See Frank, Are Judges Human?, supra note 22, at 31–39; Karl N.
Llewellyn, How Appellate Courts Decide Cases (pt. 1), 16 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 220, 227
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hand, perhaps because of their resistance to the application
of scientific method to the law, they did not seek to examine
the matter empirically.
Because the practice-oriented realists looked at law from
the perspective of the practitioner, they tended to focus on
the individual case, and considered the subjective, human
aspect of the law as inevitable and ineradicable. Instead of
ignoring it, or futilely seeking to eliminate it, they thought
lawyers should acknowledge it and to some extent even
embrace it as a source of law’s vitality.60 The idea that
judicial decisions were on occasion influenced by the judge’s
state of digestion fit right into this view and from this
perspective may not even look like an unmitigated evil. It
was a vivid illustration that law was an intuitive human art,
not an exact science. The scientific realists, on the other
hand, were more interested in identifying general patterns.
Like the natural scientists who were their models, they
wanted to discover order underneath the messiness of
surface-level reality. And unlike the practice-oriented
realists, they tended to think that uncertainty in the law was
a hindrance to social progress.61 Felix Cohen thus criticized
“certain advocates of realistic jurisprudence” for their
“willing[ness] to look upon decisions as simple unanalyzable
products of judicial hunches or indigestion.” “Law,” he

(1945).
60. See sources cited at supra note 48, all of which are from practice-oriented
realists. This moderate embrace of uncertainty should not be mistaken for the
view that judges were free to decide cases any way they wanted. Contrary to
prevailing views on the realists, they believed legal doctrine was usually fairly
determinate and capable of constraining judges. See Llewellyn, supra note 25, at
599 (“Do rules do a one hundred percent job of deciding cases with predictable
certainty? They do not . . . . But what that does is only to show that one particular
half-true formulation never should have had currency as being a whole truth. It
does not show ‘uncertainty’ in the law, and in any sense of coin-flipping
chanciness.”).
61. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Book Review, 17 A.B.A. J. 111, 112 (1931)
(reviewing FRANK, supra note 32) (“Uncertainty . . . is adventure, but adventure
is hunger and thirst and heart-ache and death. Civilization rests upon a vast,
intricate complex of expectations and prophecies.”).
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countered, “is not a mass of unrelated decisions nor a product
of judicial bellyaches.” With the right scientific methods one
can discover that law was grounded in “predictable, social
determinants that govern the course of judicial decision.”62

62. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,
35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 843 (1935); see also Felix S. Cohen, Field Theory and
Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238, 261 (1950) (criticizing Beccaria’s “‘breakfast
theory’ of judicial behavior” for failing to reveal “any correlation between bananas
or dyspepsia and the law of sales”).
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III. BUT OTHERS SAID THIS BEFORE
When Frank wrote about judicial indigestion in Courts
on Trial, he added illustrative quotations from Alexander
Pope, Charles Dickens, Lord Campbell, and Michel de
Montaigne, all drawing some link between adjudication and
digestion.63 That these remarks came mostly from nonlawyers may have served to show that lawyers, perhaps out
of excessive protectiveness to the image of their profession,
were hiding something that others have long known. If we
follow Frank’s lead and look at pre-realist writings,
especially outside traditional legal sources, we find that the
idea that judges’ rulings may be influenced by what they ate
is older than the legal realists. In nineteenth-century bar
journals there were multiple complaints about how a judge’s
disposition, including the state of his digestion, affected a
convicted criminal’s punishment.64 The idea was seemingly
familiar enough that as early as the late nineteenth century
one finds casual references to it in newspapers. For example,
in 1899 a Minnesota newspaper reported on a lecture by a
pastor named Samuel G. Smith, in which he declared that
“the administration of justice in the police courts depends
largely upon the digestion of the judges.”65 A few years into
the twentieth century, a letter to the editor to the Sunday
Oregonian stated that “[t]he same Judge might, in
accordance with the condition of his digestion at the time,
rule favorably today and unfavorably tomorrow.”66 Nor was
63. See FRANK, supra note 32, at 162–63.
64. See, e.g., F.M.C., Inequality of Sentences, 10 WEEKLY CIN. L. BULL. 27, 27
(1883) (“A bad digestion has no doubt caused many a man to spend years in the
penitentiary, while a sunny disposition has allowed many an infamous rascal to
escape well-deserved punishment.”); Punishment of Crime, 1 OHIO L.J. 108, 108
(1880).
65. Slums in Life of Cities, ST. PAUL GLOBE, Nov. 18, 1899, at 8.
66. W.V. Lance, letter to the editor, Dilatory Moves in Law: Some Judges’
Decision Shown to Be Matters of Digestion, SUNDAY OREGONIAN (Portland), Mar.
7, 1909, § 3 at 10. Some years later the same newspaper summarized an early
empirical study on sentencing, and concluded that “the length of sentences
imposed by the same judge over a period of time varied for the same offense,
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this idea, as its present-day association with American legal
realism would suggest, uniquely American, as one finds it in
British newspapers as well.67 The earliest newspaper
reference to the connection between adjudication and
digestion that I have been able to find appears in a news
report on the oral argument in a case heard before the Court
of Common Pleas in London. This litigation arose out of a
contempt of court order to jail a litigant who had insulted the
judge. The plaintiff then sued the judge and various court
officers for trespass to the person claiming that the order was
invalid. One of his lawyer’s arguments in court was that the
warrant was invalid because it was insufficiently specified.
Among other problems, it did not explain the nature of the
insult, making it impossible for a superior court to examine
whether it was of a kind that warranted a contempt order.
According to the report, the lawyer explained that without a
clear definition of the insult, “a man’s liberty might depend
upon the state of a judge’s digestion, and whether or not his
supper on the previous night had agreed with him.”68 Despite
this and other valiant efforts, he lost the case.69
Evidently, then, long before the legal realists, there was
a kind of received wisdom among cynical (or perhaps,
realistic) observers of the operation of law that personal and
psychological factors affected adjudication. Probably the
most prominent person before the legal realists to suggest
judicial decision making was influenced by such factors, and
to treat it as a serious and persistent topic for discussion, was
depending, perhaps, upon the judge’s digestion and the state of public opinion,
but the variance was still greater as between jurists.” MORNING OREGONIAN
(Portland), Oct. 21, 1932, at 8.
67. See Occasional Notes, PALL MALL GAZETTE (London), Jan. 20, 1890, at 2;
Summary of News, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, June 1, 1905, at 6.
68. Court of Common Pleas, MORNING CHRON. (London), Apr. 25, 1850, at 7.
69. The decision in the case is reported in Levy v. Moylan, S.C. 1 L.M. & P.
307, 14 Jurist 983, 138 Eng. Rep. 78 (C.P. 1850). Though these reports all contain
slightly different summaries of the oral argument, see S.C. 1 L.M. & P. at 308–
11, 14 Jurist at 984, 138 Eng. Rep. at 82–84, which are all consistent with the
newspaper report, none of them mentions judicial digestion.
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Charlton T. Lewis (1834–1904). Lewis had a wide-ranging
career as a scholar and a lawyer. He wrote a history of
Germany, compiled a Latin dictionary, and in the course of
his life lectured on a remarkably diverse range of topics,
including mathematics, Greek, and insurance. In addition to
all that, he served as counsel for the Mutual Insurance
Company, and for a short time served as the managing editor
of the New York Evening Post.70 Another issue that
preoccupied Lewis was prison reform, and late in his life he
served as president of the New York State Prison
Association. In this capacity he gave a lecture entitled “The
Principles Underlying the Problems of Crime,” which
according to a contemporaneous newspaper report criticized
the wide variance in punishment for a similar crime in the
different states, as well as within a single state: “You have
but to look at the sentences inflicted by the different judges
of this city for similar offences [sic] to see how far [the]
administration [of justice] in one State attains its ends. The
term of imprisonment which is fixed for a particular convict
depends far more upon the temper and digestion of the judge
than upon considerations of vital justice.”71 A few weeks
later, a brief note with an identical title and with Lewis’s
byline, appeared in some regional newspapers (see Figure
1).72

70. The information in the text is based on Charlton T. Lewis Dead, SUN (New
York), May 27, 1904, at 3; C.T. Lewis Dead, N.Y. TRIB., May 27, 1904, at 9;
Charlton Thomas Lewis, in OBITUARY RECORD OF GRADUATES OF YALE UNIVERSITY
(5th ser.) 324 (1904).
71. See Justice to Criminals, N.Y. TRIB., July 19, 1902, at 5.
72. See Charlton T. Lewis, Justice to Criminals, RIVER PRESS (Fort Benton),
Sep. 3, 1902, at 8; BISBEE DAILY REV., Sep. 6, 1902, at 5.
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Figure 1: Charlton Lewis on criminal justice reform, Bisbee Daily
Review (Sep. 6, 1902).

I have not been able to locate the full text of this address
either as a published article, or among Lewis’s archived
papers which are now kept at Yale University. Many of his
published lectures from the same period convey a very
similar message, although none mentions the judge’s
digestion.73 For example, in a 1904 address before the
Annual Congress of the National Prison Association, Lewis
contended that “[c]onscientious, careful and humane as
judges almost always are in performing this terrible duty, no
one can attend our criminal courts without observing the
73. Charlton Lewis, like the scientific legal realists a generation later, was
committed to the application of scientific method to legal reform on the basis of
welfarist principles. See Lewis, Principles, infra note 74, at 77; see also The
Reform of Penal Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1903, at 5.
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multitudes of instances in which sentences are passed of
surprising severity or mildness, because of some
characteristic or even some passing mood of the judge
himself.”74 Though the sentiment is the same, it is possible
that the reference to the state of a judge’s digestion was
added extemporaneously.
All these references to the idea outside academic writing
explain why when a few scholars finally decided to study
empirically the question of divergence among judges in
punishment, a colleague told them the study was pointless,
because “everyone knew that what the judge had for
breakfast frequently determined the length or kind of
sentence he gave.”75 Exploring the idea was not worth the

74. Charlton T. Lewis, False Sentiment the Bane of Penal Law, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONGRESS OF THE NATIONAL PRISON ASSOCIATION OF
THE UNITED STATES 155, 159 (1904). For other expressions of the same idea see
Charlton T. Lewis, Annual Report of the Executive Committee, in FIFTY-NINTH
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRISON ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK 11, 12 (1904)
(criticizing the “inequality of sentences arising from differences in the views and
disposition of judges.”); Charlton T. Lewis, The Indeterminate Sentence, 9 YALE
L.J. 17, 18 (1899) (retributive justice “requires of every criminal judge an utter
impossibility, and results in gross and startling inequalities whenever an attempt
is made to apply it.”); Charlton T. Lewis, The Interest of Society in Penal Reform,
at 2–3 (undated) (available at Yale University Library, Manuscripts and
Archives, Charlton T. Lewis Papers, Series I, Box 2, Folder 33); cf. Charlton T.
Lewis, Principles of Reform in Penal Law, 21 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
77, 81–82 (1903) (noting differences in maximum penalties of similar crimes)
[hereinafter Lewis, Principles]; Calls Prisons Crime Schools, N.Y. TRIB., Apr. 15,
1901, at 2 (reporting on an address by Charlton Lewis on penal law reform). It is
interesting that Lewis advocated for indeterminate sentences, because he
thought they removed the element of judicial arbitrariness from sentencing and
put “the key of his prison in [the prisoner’s] pocket.” Lewis, The Indeterminate
Sentence, supra, at 19; see also Ohio Judges Denounce Repeal of the Indeterminate
Sentence, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Feb. 28, 1915, at 8 (quoting appellate judge
Charles E. Chittenden saying that “[t]he length of a prisoner’s term should rest
with an intelligent person at the prison who is able to say whether sufficient
corrective measures have been exercised . . . . The term should not depend on
what the judge had for breakfast.”). Contrast this with Justice Breyer who used
the “what the judge had for breakfast” trope for the exact opposite sentiment. See
his words quoted in supra note 46.
75. Frederick J. Gaudet et al., Individual Differences in the Sentencing
Tendencies of Judges, 23 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 811, 812 (1933).
The conclusion of this early study was that sentencing outcomes are actually
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bother, not because it was too heretical, but because it was
too obvious.

“fairly well determined” by factors to which the judge was exposed before
becoming a judge. Id. at 814.
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IV. LEGAL REALISM NOW
What are we to make of all this? For some, the
information in Part III may be yet another illustration of the
fact that the legal realists were less original and less
important than they have been made out to be.76 For my part,
I think some legal realists’ willingness to take the idea
seriously, to consider the question of judicial decision making
as a worthy subject of study and not a mere topic for off-therecord remarks, is enough to explain part of the realists’
lasting influence. In the end, however, none of the realists
ever suggested that adjudication is primarily, let alone
exclusively, determined by judges’ passing ailments. And
none of the realists, of whatever stripe, ever put the question
to any kind of empirical examination. This may be because,
while not dismissing it, they treated it more as a humorous
way of conveying the broader point, that the personality of
the judge affects the outcome of cases. But it is possible that
when they encountered what we now know was a nineteenthcentury expression, they (like most of us today) missed the
full significance it used to have a few generations before.
As historians now tell us, nineteenth-century writers
often placed the stomach at the center of human health and
drew direct links between gastric and mental health.77
“Considering the enormous influence the human stomach
has exercised on the history of world and of individuals,” as
one book put it without a hint of irony, “it is astonishing that
people are so little careful how they treat it, and what they

76. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST–REALIST DIVIDE: THE
ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING 67–90 (2010) (arguing that many of the ideas
attributed to the legal realists predate them).
77. See IAN MILLER, A MODERN HISTORY OF THE STOMACH: GASTRIC ILLNESS,
MEDICINE AND BRITISH SOCIETY 1800–1950, at 10–25 (2011); Emilie TaylorBrown, Being “Hangry”: Gastrointestinal Health and Emotional Well-Being in the
Long Nineteenth Century, in GUT FEELING AND DIGESTIVE HEALTH IN NINETEENTHCENTURY LITERATURE, HISTORY AND CULTURE 109 (Manon Mathias & Alison M.
Moore ed., 2018) [hereinafter GUT FEELING]; Steven Shapin, Gutted, LONDON REV.
BOOKS, June 30, 2011, at 15 (reviewing MILLER, supra).
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put into it.”78 Another book noted that the “mental faculties
always suffer” as a result of various stomach ailments,
noting specifically that they lead to a “cynical and faultfinding spirit.”79 Books from earlier in the nineteenth
century went even further, one going so far as to assert that
seven-eighths of human illnesses, including insanity,
originate in indigestion.80 Against this background to say
that the outcome of a case, or the severity of punishment,
depends on a judge’s digestion was not simply an amusing
way of saying that the outcomes of cases were unpredictable
and depended on more than legal rules. It may have been
taken more literally, meaning that a judge’s personality or
mental health affect the judicial decisions. If this is true, it
is possible that the two expressions we take to be largely
interchangeable (what the judge had for breakfast, and
references to the state of the judge’s digestion) may have
been understood differently in the nineteenth century. The
state of one’s digestion both reflected and influenced who one
was.81 The transient influence of a particular meal is a
different thing.
By the 1920s, when the legal realists began gaining
prominence, the stomach was losing its status as the site and
source of humans’ mental health. By then a host of new
psychological theories vied for lawyers’ attention. For some
of the scientific legal realists it was behaviorism, with its
focus on observation and precise measurement, that proved
attractive;82 for Frank, whose outlook was more humanistic,
78. JOHN H. CLARKE, INDIGESTION: ITS CAUSES AND CURE, at v (London, James
Epps & Co. 1888).
79. ADOLPHUS E. BRIDGER, THE DEMON OF DYSPEPSIA OR DIGESTION PERFECT
127 (London, Swan Sonnenschein, Lowery & Co. 1888).

AND IMPERFECT

80. See THOMAS J. GRAHAM, A TREATISE ON INDIGESTION: WITH OBSERVATIONS
SOME PAINFUL COMPLAINTS CONSEQUENT ON INDIGESTION, ESPECIALLY
NERVOUS AFFECTIONS 183 (London, Simpkin and Marshall, 4th ed. 1838).
ON

81. See Steven Shapin, ‘You Are What You Eat’: Historical Changes in Ideas
about Food and Identity, 87 HIST. RES. 377 (2014).
82. See Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of
Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457, 475 (1924) (“we as lawyers, like the physical scientists,
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Freudian ideas were the route to greater understanding.83
All that remained of the concern over a judge’s digestion was
a little joke.
Both behaviorism and psychoanalysis are now largely
historical curiosities. These days lawyers turn to cognitive
and brain science for insights on the human mind. And in an
ironic turn of history, thanks to this closer attention to the
brain, the stomach has made something of a comeback. One
strand of this old-new idea is now called “the gut–brain axis,”
and it has been the subject of “an explosion of scientific
research” in recent years.84 This research has shown
surprising relationships, still not fully understood, between
the state of the human digestive system, as well as the
microbiome that lives in it, and cognitive and emotional
health.85

are engaged in the study of objective physical phenomena. Instead of the behavior
of electrons, atoms, or planets, however, we are dealing with the behavior of
human beings.”); Underhill Moore, Rational Basis of Legal Institutions, 23
COLUM. L. REV. 609, 609–10 (1923); Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis,
14 A.B.A. J. 71, 76 (1928).
83. See FRANK, supra note 32, at 18 (“To the child the father is the Infallible
Judge . . . . The Law . . . inevitably becomes a partial substitute for the Fatheras-Infallible-Judge. That is, the desire persists in grown men to recapture,
through a rediscovery of a father, a childish, completely controllable universe,
and that desire seeks satisfaction in a partial, unconscious, anthropomorphizing
of Law, in ascribing to the Law some of the characteristics of the child’s FatherJudge.”). Though passages such as this explain the book’s notoriety, they are far
less significant than often assumed for the book’s overall argument. For a more
direct attempt to apply psychoanalysis to the law see Theodore Schroeder, The
Psychologic Study of Judicial Opinions, 6 CALIF. L. REV. 89 (1918). It is notable
that Frank criticized Schroeder for thinking that with the aid of psychology,
discovering the hidden causes of legal decisions would be easy. See FRANK, supra
note 32, at 113–15.
84. See Manon Mathias & Alison M. Moore, The Gut Feelings of Medical
Culture, in GUT FEELING, supra note 77, at 1, 2.
85. See generally EMERAN MAYER, THE MIND–GUT CONNECTION: HOW THE
HIDDEN CONVERSATION WITHIN OUR BODIES IMPACTS OUR MOOD, OUR CHOICES,
AND OUR OVERALL HEALTH (2016); Emeran A. Mayer, Gut Feelings: The Emerging
Biology of Gut–Brain Communication, 12 NATURE REV. NEUROSCIENCE 453
(2011). The new research suggests there may be some basis for “gut feeling”
decision making. See id. at 461.
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A different strand of research grows out of cognitive
psychology’s obsession with decision making. If much of the
first generation of decision-making studies focused on the
influence of cognitive biases and heuristics that most
humans are prone to,86 newer research pays more attention
to the impact of environmental conditions on decisions.
Studies exploring this question have shown that hunger and
other kinds of physical discomfort affect cognitive abilities
and decision making.87 One recent study that generated
considerable attention and is particularly pertinent to this
Essay picked up the examination of the influence of judicial
digestion where the realists left it. It examined the decisions
of a parole board in Israel and found that prisoners whose
case was heard early in the morning were more likely to have
their petition granted than those whose cases were heard
just before lunch. The board became sympathetic again after
the lunch break with rates of release declining again
afterwards, leading the study’s authors to conclude that
hunger and tiredness were the most likely explanation of
their findings.88 These conclusions remain controversial, as
others suggested alternative explanations for these findings,
including the impact of legal representation or the possibility
that the cases were not heard in random order.89
86. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2012).
87. See ROY Y. BAUMEISTER & JOHN TIERNEY, WILLPOWER: REDISCOVERING THE
GREATEST HUMAN STRENGTH 22–23, 225–26 (2011) (hunger diminishes
willpower); SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN & ELDAR SHAFIR, SCARCITY: WHY HAVING TOO
LITTLE MEANS SO MUCH 5–8 (2013) (extreme hunger affecting interests and
cognitive abilities); cf. George Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences on
Behavior, 65 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 272 (1996) (visceral
factors, including hunger, affect behavior in ways that cannot be explained in
terms of standard decision models). It is worth noting that the judge mentioned
by La Mettrie behaved in the opposite way, being harsher when sated. See supra
note 37 and accompanying text.
88. See Shai Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6889 (2011).
89. See Keren Weinshall-Margel & John Shapard, Overlooked Factors in the
Analysis of Parole Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. E833 (2011); but see Shai
Danziger et al., Reply to Weinshall-Margel and Shapard: Extraneous Factors in
Judicial Decisions Persist, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. E834 (2011) (reaffirming
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A controlled experimental setting, despite its
limitations, might shed further light on the question. To test
it, subjects would be given the task of adjudicating an
identical sequence of cases over several hours. The cases
would either be based exclusively on written materials or on
videotaped “trial(s)” that will ensure that all subjects are
given identical evidence, presented in exactly the same way.
Subjects will have to decide whether to convict the
defendants, and if they convict, to decide on the appropriate
punishment. Some of the subjects will be given access to food
throughout the process while others kept hungry. For extra
flavor, one could further examine whether different kinds of
food (sweet versus salty, spicy versus mild) have any
discernable effect on the decision made. Until such a study is
undertaken it looks like we are in the same place Llewellyn
was in when writing in 1940—with a plausible hypothesis,
but no decisive answer.
As for historians, they may have another question in
store. The April and May 1914 issues of several Christian
magazines carried a short advertisement that looks at first
like a genuine news report (see
Figure 2). This early example of native advertising tells
of an unnamed member of New York’s state Prison
Commission who is “reported to have said” in a public
address that “[t]he whole system of sentencing is absurd. The
length of a man’s sentence sometimes depends upon the
judge’s digestion.”90 The copywriter did not find this
original conclusions).
90. Judges and Digestion, 89 CHRISTIAN ADVOC. 551 (1914); 109 CHURCHMAN
517 (1914); 99 CONGREGATIONALIST & CHRISTIAN WORLD 538 (1914); 45
CONTINENT 521 (1914); 20 ASSEMBLY HERALD 285 (1914). Though not identified
in the ad, the reference is to Thomas Mott Osborne, who at the time was chair of
the New York State Commission on Prison Reform. See Digestion Factor in
Prison Terms, Malefactors Hear, BUFF. COURIER, Mar. 2, 1914, at 7, according to
which Osborne’s view was that “[t]he whole system of sentencing is absurd. The
length of a man’s sentence sometimes depends upon the judge’s digestion.” These
are the exact words attributed to the prison commissioner in the ad. Like Lewis
before him, Osborne advocated the indeterminate sentence as a solution to this
problem, and as an incentive for rehabilitation. See id.
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suggestion too alarming. After all, “[j]udges are only human
beings,” and there is no doubt that a “disordered or impaired
digestion” will get in the way of “thinking clearly, fairly,
judiciously.”91 But the ad went on to suggest a more
intriguing link between indigestion and the law: “it is a fact
that a well-balanced ration, such as shredded wheat biscuit,
with fresh fruits, develops an evenness of disposition and a
vigor and equilibrium in the bodily functions.” The wrong
kind of food, one with “an excess of proteid,” can lead to “the
accumulation of toxins in the body.” Persist with such a diet,
and the body will eventually not be able to rid itself of this
“poison.” The ad remains conveniently non-committal on the
question whether the “more heinous crimes can be traced to
indigestion,”92 but this suggestion is enough for students of
gastro-juridical history to wonder whether it was here that
the Twinkie defense was born.

91. Judges and Digestion, 89 CHRISTIAN ADVOC. 551 (1914).
92. Id.
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Figure 2: One version of
the ad mentioned in the
text (this one from
The Christian Advocate)
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